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Article 5

CRAFT SEVERANCE: NLRB'S NEW APPROACH
Introduction to the Problem of Craft Severance
Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that
the National Labor Relations Board' "shall decide in each case whether,
inorder to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit or subdivision
thereof..
,' A fundamental problem raised by this provision is
under what circumstances a craft unit is the appropriate unit. The problem frequently arises when a group of employees who are members of
an existing plant-wide union seek to be represented separately. The
group of employees, or the labor union seeking to represent that group,
files a petition under section 9(c) of the act,3 and requests that the Board
sever a craft or departmental unit from the plant-wide unit.
Craft employees usually seek separate representation because they
believe that their unique problems and interests are not adequately considered by the industrial unit,4 and that their economic position is weakened by inclusion in the larger unit.5 This belief is well-founded since
there is empirical evidence to indicate that craft employees who have obtained severed units are better represented than they were while members
of the industrial unit.6 Most employers resist severance because it tends
to create problems for them. Often the fragmentation of the industrial
bargaining unit in a highly integrated industry reduces production efficiency7 and creates the possibility of jurisdictional disputes regarding
work assignments.' When there are two or more unions in a single
plant, there is a greater possibility of strikes.9
Section 9(b), as originally enacted, allowed the Board considerable
discretion to determine under what circumstances a craft unit should
1. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
2. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), added by 61 Stat. 143

(1947), as amended, 29 u.s.c. 159(b) (1964).

3. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), added by 61 Stat. 143

(1947), as amended, 29 u.s.c. 159(c) (1964).

4. Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations, 58 MIcH. L. Rav. 313,

334 (1960).

5. Id. at 334-35.
6. Id. at 335, 341.
7. Id. at 326-33; American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1422 (1954).
8. Jones, supra note 4, at 326-33; American Potash & Chem. Corp., supra note 7, at
1422; 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 586, 589 (1967).
9. Jones, supra note 4, at 326; American Potash & Chem. Corp., supra note 8, at 1422;
54 COLUm. L. Rav. 1159, 1160-61 (1954).
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be severed. In Matter of American Can Company, the Board adopted
the position that the bargaining history of the employer might provide
a suitable basis for denying craft severance." ° Congress, however, felt
that the American Can doctrine unduly restricted the rights of craft
Therefore, in order to make
employees to be fairly represented."
separate craft representation more easily obtainable by craft employees,
while preserving the Board's discretion to determine when craft severance
in inappropriate, 2 Congress enacted a provisio to section 9(b). That
proviso precludes the Board from deciding "that any craft unit is inappropriate

.

.

. on the ground that a different unit has been estab-

lished by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation."' 3
In construing the section 9(b) (2) proviso the Board
National Tube-'4American Potash doctrine.' 5 Under that
severance was available to any true craft group in which
the members voted for craft severance.' 6 A large number

developed the
doctrine craft
a majority of
of craft units

10. 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939).
11. "Since the decision in the American Can case (13 N.L.R.B. 1252), where the
Board refused to permit craft units to be 'carved out' from a broader bargaining unit
already established, the Board, except under unusual circumstances, has virtually compelled skilled artisans to remain part of a comprehensive plant unit. The colmnittee regards the application of this doctrine as inequitable." (Emphasis added.) S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 1 LEGISLATIV HIsTORY OF THE LMRA 417-18 (1947).
"[T]he legisative history indicates that this proviso grew out of Congressional concern
that the American Can doctrine unduly restricted the rights of craft employees to seek
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, Uranium Div., 5 CCH LAB. L.
separate representation ....
REP. (162 N.L.R.B. No 48) q 20981, at 27162 (Dec. 28, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Mallinckrodt, with page number references to 5 CCH LAB. L. REP.].
12. Congress did not intend to take away the Board's discretionary authority to
find craft units to be inappropriate for collective-bargaining purposes if a review of all the facts, both pro and con severance, led to such result. Thus, as
stated in Senate Report No. 105 on S. 1126, submitted by Senator Taft:
OUR BILL STILL LEAVES TO THE BOARD DISCRE"...
TION TO REVIEW ALL THE FACTS IN DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE UNIT, but it may not decide that any craft unit is inappropriate
on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board
determination." [Emphasis supplied.]
Mallinckrodt at 27162.
A statement by Senator Taft on the floor of the Senate is to the same
effect: "In effect I think it (Section 9(b) (2)) gives greater power to the craft
units to organize separately. It does not go the full way of giving them the
absolute right in every case; it simply provides that the Board shall have discretion and shall not bind itself by previous decision, but that the subject shall
always be open for further consideration." 93 Cong. Rec. 3952; 2 Leg. Hist.
1009.
Mallinckrodt at 27162 n.9.
13. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b) (2), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), added by 61 Stat.
143 (1947), as amended, 29 u.s.c. 159(b) (1964).
14. 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948).
15. 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
16. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1423 (1954).
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were successfully severed under the doctrine,"7 often with resulting disruption of labor relations in those plants affected.'
Experience with the National Tube-American Potash doctrine indicated that it did not provide a satisfactory solution to the craft severance
problem. 9 Therefore, in the recent Mallinckrodt Chemical Works,
Uranium Division case the Board reevaluated its rules governing craft
severance and abolished the doctrine. Under the new standard, requests
for craft severance are treated on a case-by-case evaluation of all relevant
criteria.2 ° An examination of the Board's experience with the National
Tube-American Potash doctrine reveals its inadequacies and indicates
potential problems under the M11allinckrodt doctrine.
The National Tube-American. Potash Doctrine
The Board first interpreted the section 9(b) (2) proviso in the
National Tube case which involved a petition for craft severance in the
steel industry.2 ' After a detailed analysis of the proviso and its legislative history, the Board concluded that the only restriction it imposed was
that neither a prior Board determination nor the bargaining history of
the employer could be the sole basis for denying craft severance. 2 The
Board dismissed the petition because the steel industry was highly integrated and because there was a tradition of plant-wide and industry-wide
bargaining.2 3 In subsequent cases the Board applied the rationale of
National Tube to other industries: aluminum,2 4 wet milling,25 and lumber.2" The Board then consistently refused to extend the National Tube
doctrine to any other industriesY
In time, however, it became apparent to the Board that the National
Tube doctrine "had the effect of permanently foreclosing units in an
entire industry by freezing that industry into an industrial unit for bargaining purposes."2 A view developed that craft severance should not
be denied merely because the production process was integrated or be17. For example, in the three years from March 1, 1954, to June 1, 1957, at least
forty-three craft units were severed from production units. Jones, supra note 4, at 324-25.
18. Id. at 336-40.
19. NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,

361 U.S. 943 (1960).
20. Mallinckrodt at 27164-65.

21. 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948).
22. Id. at 1205.
23. Id. at 1207.
24. Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950).
25. Corn Prods. Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 187 (1949).
26. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 187 (1949).
27. Monsanto Chemical Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 69 (1957); Dow Chemical Co., 116
N.L.R.B. 1602 (1956); North American Aviation, 115 N.L.R.B. 1090 (1956); American
Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
28. American Potash & Chem. Corp., supra note 27, at 1420.
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cause the pattern of collective bargaining was industry wide. 29 Thus, in
American Potash the Board held that in order to give the proper effect to
the section 9(b) (2) proviso every true group must have the opportunity
to choose in a craft severance election whether to be represented on an
industry-wide or a craft basis.30 The standard adopted was that craft
severance was appropriate in every case "where a true craft group is
sought and where, in addition, the union is one which traditionally represents that craft."3 '
However, instead of totally abolishing the National Tube doctrine in
American Potash, the Board adopted the inconsistent position that severance should not be permitted in the four "favored" industries because
it was not "wise or feasible to upset a pattern of collective bargaining
already firmly established ..
*,32
The effect was to permanently foreclose the possibility of establishing craft units in the four "favored"
industries. 3
Board adherence to the National Tube doctrine for the four "favored" industries became the principal criticism of the American Potash
decision. For example in NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.3 4 the
court recognized that the only factors that the Board had relied upon to
distinguish the four "favored" industries from other industries were
the integrated nature of the industries and the historical pattern of plantwide bargaining in those industries.3 5 The court argued that since other
industries have production processes which are highly integrated and
have consistent histories of plant-wide bargaining the Board's distinction
was arbitrary and capricious." In addition, the court argued that re29. "[T]he right of separate representation should not be denied the members of a
craft group merely because they are employed in an industry which involves highly integrated production processes and in which the prevailing pattern of bargaining is industrial
in character." American Potash & Chem. Corp., supra note 28, at 1421.

30. Id. at 1422, 1423.
31. Id. at 1422.
32. Ibid.
33. The American Potash decision automatically precluded severance of craft units
in the National Tube industries. Mallinckrodt at 27164.
34. 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960).

35. Id. at 174.
36. Instead of selecting an appropriate bargaining union after a study of the circumstances of the case before it, it [the Board] followed its announced policy
of acceding to the wishes of a small group of employees, comprising a craft,
for separate representation, although potent reasons existed for the plantwide
representation desired by the employers and the great majority of the workers.
Conceivably such a decision could be justified by the circumstances of a given
case, but in this instance it must be condemned as discriminatory, in view of
the conflicting policy and action of the Board in denying craft representation
and direct plantwide representation under precisely similar circumstances in
certain selected fields.
Ibid.
Three years later the same court was presented with essentially the same problem.
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tention of the described policy violated the express provisions of the
87
section 9(b) (2) proviso.
Another criticism of the American Potash decision was that its
"traditional representative" test was inadequate. It soon became apparent
that this test had the effect of preventing new craft organizations from
representing a craft unit.3
Therefore, the Board held that if a craft
organization was newly created for the "sole and exclusive" purpose of
representing craft employees, it qualified as a traditional craft union. 9
The "traditional representative" test of American Potash was, in effect,
abandoned.4"
The American Potash doctrine was criticized because it ignored the
interests of employees ineligible for a craft unit of the plant-wide unions
and of the employer. 4 Those employees ineligible for the proposed craft
group and the plant-wide union have vital interests in maintaining the
"collective strength" of the union,4 2 and the employer and the plant wide
Again the court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's bargaining order and emphasized the Board's inconsistent and arbitrary opinion in American Potash. Royal McBee
Corp. v. NLRB, 302 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1962).
Eventually the Board recognized that the American Potash decision was arbitrary and
capricious. "Furthermore, the American Potash decision makes arbitrary distinctions between industries by forbidding the application of the National Tube doctrine to other industries whose operations are as highly integrated, and whose plantwide bargaining patterns are as well established, as is the case in the so-called 'National Tube' industries."
Mallinckrodt at 27164.
37. The policy that the four favored industries should be immune from craft severance "is solely based . . . on its [the Board's] prior determination that in these industries
craft representation will not be tolerated. This position.., plainly constitutes a violation
of the express provision of § 9(b) (2) of the statute, which forbids the Board to decide
that any craft unit is inappropriate on the ground that a different unit has been established
by a prior Board determination." NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra note 36,
at 175.
38. To hold to the contrary, as under our dissenting colleagues' interpretation of
the American Potash decision, would mean that craft employees who desire
craft representation are forever wedded to the past. They could no longer
create new craft organizations. We do not think it proper for a governmental
agency to grant monopoly rights to particular labor organizations to the point
of preventing new craft unions desired by employees from coming into being.
Friden Calculation Mach. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1618, 1619-20 (1954).
39. Id. at 1619.
40. By its decision in this case, the majority has, for all practical purposes, abandoned the "traditional union" test and reinstated the rule in effect prior to
the American Potash decision which permitted craft severance irrespective of
whether or not the petitioning union was by history, tradition, and experience
equipped to serve and advance the special interests of the specific craft involved.
Id. at 1622-23 (dissenting opinion).
41. Mallinckrodt at 27162, 27164.
42. In short, application of these mechanistic tests [of American Potash] leads
always to the conclusion that the interests of craft employees always prevail.
It does this, moreover, without affording a voice in the decision to the other
employees, whose unity of association is broken and whose collective strength
is weakened by the success of the craft or departmental group in pressing its
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union have an interest "in maintaining overall plant stability in labor
relations and uninterrupted operation of industrial or commercial facilities."" In American Potash the Board disregarded the interests that
might favor continuance of the established bargaining relationship.44
These criticisms made it obvious that the American Potash doctrine
did not provide "a satisfactory resolution of the issues posed in craft
severance cases." 45 The Mallinckrodt doctrine was conceived to meet
these criticisms.
The Mallinckrodt Doctrine
In developing a new doctrine the Board hoped to avoid the lack of
uniform application that characterized the American Potash doctrine by
applying the same rules to each industry and to each employer.4" Second,
the Board wanted to conform its craft severance practice as nearly as
possible to the congressional intent expressed in the legislative history of
the section 9(b) (2) proviso.47
To achieve uniformity, the Board in Mallinckrodt abolished the
American Potash tests and the "favored" status of the four industries
within the National Tube rule.48 The Board interpreted the legislative
history of the section 9(b) (2) proviso as rejecting the view that craft
employees should have the absolute right to a severance election in every
case and as giving the Board discretionary authority to determine the
appropriateness of craft units. 49 The Board held that each petition
should be decided on the basis of all the relevant criteria in the case. The
Board enumerated the specified criteria that it deemed to be relevant. 5 '
The first criterion enumerated is whether the proposed unit is a true
craft group working in a trade "for which a tradition of separate representation exists."'" Another revelant criterion is the history of collective
bargaining of the employees, of the employer (including the history at
the plant involved), and of the industry.52 A consideration in weighing
this criterion is the effect of craft severance on the stability of labor relaown special interests.

Id. at 27164.
43. Id. at 27162.

44. Id. at 27162, 27164.

45. Id. at 27164.
46. Id. at 27158, 27165.
47. Id. at 27163-64.
48. 'It is patent, from the foregoing, that the American Potash tests do not effectuate

the policies of the act. We shall, therefore, no longer allow our inquiry to be limited by
them." Id. at 27164.
49. Id. at 27163-64.
50. Id. at 27164-65.
51. Id. at 27164.
52. Id. at 27165.
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tions.53 The Board has consistently felt that bargaining history is relevant to determining whether a unit is appropriate.54 A third criterion is
the amount and quality of effort that the employees in the proposed unit
have expended to maintain a separate identity while submerged in a plantwide unit." Analysis of this criterion involves an examination of the
amount of participation, or lack of participation, by the employees' previous efforts to obtain a craft union. 6 A fourth criterion is the extent to
which the employer's production processes have been integrated.57 This
criterion recognizes that the interests of the employer might favor continuing the established bargaining units.5" The last relevant criterion is
the "qualifications" of the union that wants to sever the group of employees. 9 Weighing this criterion involves an examination of the union's
experience in representing other employees similar to those it seeks to
represent.60
Although the Board enumerated these specific criteria, it was careful
to emphasize that it intends to remain flexible in considering such questions.61 The criteria are not to be deemed "an inclusive or exclusive listing of the various considerations involved in making unit determinations
in this area." 2 Thus all relevant criteria will be considered when de63
termining the appropriate unit.
A Prognosis of the Mallinckrodt Doctrine
The Board formulated the Mallinckrodt doctrine in an attempt to
eliminate the problems left unsolved by the American Potash doctrine.
The natural question is whether those problems will be satisfactorily
eliminated and whether any additional problems will develop.
Mallinckrodt seemingly does not completely eliminate the lack of uniformity in craft severance. The Mallinckrodt doctrine was formulated
primarily to regulate requests for craft severance elections64 and will
probably be restricted to that puropse as was the American Potash doctrine.65 Thus, those employees who have had craft bargaining units
53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. "[W]e have undertaken in this and other cases a review of our present policies
regarding severance elections." Id. at 27161.
65. "'American Potash is an exception to the general rule permitting freedom of
choice to the employees. As such, it has been narrowly construed by the Board as limited
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severed from an original plant-wide unit will not be able to obtain a
plant-wide unit under Mallinckrodt, whereas employers operating under
similar conditions but without severed craft units (because the American Potash doctrine was never applied to them) might be able to retain
their industrial unit. Mallinckrodt does not provide a procedure by which
an employer who has had craft units severed by an original plant-wide
unit can request the Board to reopen the unit determination question. Thus,
Mallinckrodt has created a pool of employers, largely ignored by the
Board, whose original plant-wide units have been permanently broken
down into two or more units.
Even if the Mallinckrodt doctrine were applied on the reopening of
a unit determination, the severed unit would probably be retained. An
analysis of the Mallinckrodt criteria 6 suggests that an established craft
unit would be an appropriate unit. The fact that the craft unit had been
severed would make it difficult for the employer to show that a plant-wide
union is more appropriate because if the Board had decided it was appropriate under the American Potash doctrine it probably was a true craft
group. Even if it was an erroneous decision originally, by the time of
the redetermination the group would constitute a true craft under the
American Potash criteria; at least, since the original severance and passage of time would in itself provide those requirements. Thus, in most
cases the true craft group would exist, the craft employees would have
maintained their separate identity, and the union would be qualified to
represent those employees. The history of collective bargaining of the
employer would show a pattern of multi-unit bargaining instead of plantwide bargaining. The only relevant criteria that might support the employer's position would be the bargaining history of the industry and
the degree of integration of its production process. These factors would
probably not be sufficiently persuasive to overcome the craft union s
arguments. Even if the bargaining history of the industry reflected
plant-wide bargaining, the bargaining history of the employer would still
reflect multi-unit bargaining. This would make bargaining history an
inconclusive factor. Also, it is implicit in a prior Board opinion that the
integration of the industry is not sufficient to outweigh other criteria.6 7
Employers having severed craft units should be afforded an opportunity to obtain a reevaluation of the appropriate bargaining unit for their
plants. Clearly, the Board recognized in Mallinckrodt that the American
only to severance cases i.e. to situations where a smaller craft or departmental unit is to be

carved out of an established broader unit."' NLRB v. Industrial Rayon Corp., 291 F.2d
809, 811 (4th Cir. 1961) (quoting from the Board's opinion below).
66. Mallinckrodt at 27164-65.
67. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1420-24 (1954).
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Potash doctrine was erroneous6" and did not give proper effect to the
9(b) (2) proviso.69 If the doctrine was erroneous, the severed units resulting from its application are probably inappropriate. To allow those
unit determinations to remain unmodified is to perpetrate the ill-considered
approach of American Potash.
A procedure for redetermination would be similar to an original unit
determination proceeding. The employer, or the prior plant-wide union,
would file the representation petition. The petition would allege that the
employer, or the union, has been arbitrarily discriminated against by the
American Potash decision. The petition would request a hearing to redetermine the appropriate unit. At the hearing the bargaining history
of the employer or the plant should be given little significance since the
bargaining history would have been adversely altered by the previous application of the American Potash doctrine. Following the hearing, the
Board would determine the appropriate unit in accord with the Mallinckrodt criteria. A new statute is probably necessary to create this type of
procedure.
Another issue is whether a new employer, or an unorganized employer, should be entitled to a plant-wide union. The problem arises when
a craft union wants to organize a segment of an unorganized plant and
the employer resists such partial unionization on the ground that a plantwide unit is more appropriate. The employer's argument is that the
Mallinckrodt criteria must be applied in determining whether or not a
plant-wide unit is appropriate at an unorganized plant. Thus if an
employer can show that the criteria favorable to a plant-wide unit exist
in his plant, he argues that the craft unit should be denied. Although
the employer's argument appears reasonable and persuasive, it will probably be rejected. Since Mallinckrodt was decided, the Board has permitted the establishment of a craft unit in an unorganized plant and has
rejected this argument by an employer. ° Also, an unorganized employer
should not be able to resist partial unionization of his plant by a craft
union on the theory that a plant-wide union, which is presently unavailable, is perhaps more appropriate.
[I]t is not the responsibility of the . . . Board to keep
the field open for some hypothetical future plant-wide union by
keeping out craft unions or departmental unions, which if they
got in, might at some indefinite time in the future mar the sym68. Mallinckrodt at 27163, 27164.
69. Id. at 27164.
70. E. I. Depont de Nemours & Co., 5 CCH

20982 (Dec. 28, 1966).

LAD.

L.

REP.

(162 N.L.R.B. No. 49) q
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metry of plant-wide bargaining. 71
If this type of resistance were allowed, the employer might continuously resist unionization of his plant by craft unions, a tactic which is
contrary to the policy of the NLRA.
The problem of achieving uniformity among all industries might
not be as serious as indicated because of the tendency of the Board to
apply the "true craft group" test at the initial unit determination. By
using that test when a union first attempts to organize a plant the Board
will achieve some measure of uniformity in its craft unit determinations.
This will provide equal treatment, at least in the future, for all industries.
Another problem which can be anticipated under the Mallinckrodt
doctrine is that craft workers will be denied the right to determine
for themselves which union will represent them. This right of selfdetermination is one of the fundamental reasons for the 9 (b) (2) proviso
and for the decision in American Potash. It was the desire of Congress
and the Board to afford to the employees every opportunity to choose
their own collective bargaining representative.7 1 When craft severance
is denied without an election, the employees affected are precluded from
determining which labor organization is best able to represent their
interests. The principle of self-determination is recognized, and the employees are given the opportunity to choose, by election, their own representative when a labor organization first attempts to organize an unorganized plant or group within a plant. It has been argued that the
employees should have the same freedom to choose their representative
when they are already members of a labor organization. 7' Therefore,
to the extent that Mallinckrodt denies craft severance without an election,
it has the effect of denying the employees the right to choose their own
bargaining representative.
However, as long as the Board has the statutory duty to make unit
determinations the employees must be denied the absolute right to selfdetermination. That right must be balanced against the Board's statutory
duty. A denial of a request for an election merely reflects the Board's
71. Warren v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 494, 500 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958
(1966).
72. The lesson which we draw is that, consistent with the clear intent of Congress, it is not the province of this Board to dictate the course and pattern of
labor organization in our vast industrial complex. If millions of employees
today feel that their interests are better served by craft unionism, it is not for
us to say that they can only be represented on an industrial basis or for that
matter that they must bargain on strict craft lines.... [T]rue craft groups

should have an opportunity to decide the issue for themselves. (Emphasis
added.)
American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1422-23 (1954).
73. Mallinckrodt at 27167-68 (dissenting opinion).
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desire to hold timely elections instead of granting an unfettered right to
self-determination.
Application of the enumerated criteria that the Board deemed relevent will present several problems which will call for judicious adjustment to the facts of the particular case. The "true craft group" criterion raises the possibility that no new types of craft groups can be
established because the criterion requires that a tradition of separate
representation exist. 4 A group of employees comprising a new trade
that has never before been recognized as a craft or departmental unit
would have difficulty demonstrating that it has traditionally been represented by a craft union. Without such a tradition, the group might
be precluded from having separate representation. Therefore, in evaluating a petition for a new type of craft unit, the Board should avoid placing
too much emphasis on this criterion.
Also, the nonjudicious use of the criterion that looks to the union's
"experience" in representing the employees it seeks to represent 5 might
preclude the creation of new craft units since a newly organized craft
union could not have any experience in representing craft employees.
However, since the Board wants to remain flexible in its approach to craft
severance, it is doubtful whether this criterion will be misused in this
manner.
Two additional criteria that will call for judicious application are
the extent of participation by the employees in the plant-wide unit and
the extent of their previous efforts to obtain a craft union.7' The relevance of these criteria is questionable. Since the employees in the
proposed craft unit have been in the plant-wide unit they would necessarily
have had to participate in that union in order to protect their interests.
Thus any participation in the plant-wide union would not make the craft
union any less, or any more, appropriate. However, a lack of participation would indicate that the employees were not interested in protecting
their interests through the plant-wide unit and might, in fact, reflect
their conviction that it was unable or unwilling to protect their interests.
Nor should prior efforts to obtain a craft unit be over-emphasized
in making a unit determination. The contemporary industrial climate is
one of rapid change in the types of skills used in the production process,
and, therefore, in the community of interests among employees. 7 Such
74. Id. at 27164.
75. Id. at 27165.

76. Ibid.
77. "We are in a period of industrial progress and change which so profoundly affect
the product, process, operational technology, and organization of industry that a concomitant upheaval is reflected in the types and standards of skill, the working arrangements, job requirements, and community of interests of employees." Id. at 27165 n.16.
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change means that the desire and the need for a craft unit can vary
greatly in a short period of time. As a result, this criterion should be
used with caution.
Conclusion
Although there are several problems that the Mallinckrodt doctrine
has not solved and although there are some weaknesses in the enumerated
criteria, it represents the best solution to date to craft severance problems,
and more nearly conforms to the legislative intent."8 All industries and
all employers will be subject to the same standards.7" All relevant
Each craft severance petition will be
criteria will be considered."
decided on its own merits, and both the employer and the union will
be given an apportunity to present all of the arguments favorable to
their positions.8" Also, the Board intends to remain flexible in its
approach to craft severance.8 2 Thus, this doctrine has none of the
obvious flaws of the American Potash doctrine.
The potential danger in the Mallinckrodt doctrine is not in the
doctrine itself, but in the administration of that doctrine. Unless the
Board weighs all of the relevant criteria, weighs them properly, and
makes its decision on the merits of each case, the administration of
the rule will destroy the flexibility of the doctrine.
78. Id. at 27163-64.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 27165.
Ibid.
Id. at 27164.
Id. at 27165.

